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THE BUCK STOPS HERE: FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS INFRINGEMENTS CAN NO 
LONGER BE IGNORED WHEN 
TRANSFERRING ASYLUM SEEKERS 
UNDER DUBLIN II 
XING-YIN NI* 
Abstract: Many asylum seekers entering the European Union (EU) cross more 
than one Member State border before lodging their asylum claims. In response, 
the EU adopted Dublin II to designate the point of first entry, rather than the 
point of application, as the State responsible for examining the claim. Unfortu-
nately, this allocation of examination responsibilities overburdens States on the 
frontline of entry, such as Greece, and has exacerbated the systemic deficiencies 
in these states’ asylum systems. The Court of Justice of the European Union’s 
decision in the Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10 helped clarify that a receiving 
state cannot transfer asylum seekers to the responsible state if they would be sub-
jected to inhumane treatment there. Although this decision halted Dublin II trans-
fers to states where fundamental rights risked being violated, the EU continues to 
struggle with an unbalanced distribution of asylum claims. Until the principle of 
solidarity is put into practice and more claims are shifted to lesser-burdened 
states, the EU will not meet its goal of creating a fair and effective Common Eu-
ropean Asylum Policy. 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 21, 2011, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) delivered a critical interpretation of European Union 
(EU) asylum law in the case N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
& M. E. et al. v. Refugee Applications Commissioner et al.1 The landmark deci-
sion has significant repercussions on the EU’s commitment to implementing a 
common asylum system across its Member States.2 For such a system to func-
tion, it is imperative that each Member State shares a common understanding of 
                                                                                                                           
 * Xing-Yin Ni is the Executive Comment Editor for Volume 38 of the Boston College Interna-
tional & Comparative Law Review. 
 1 See Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10, N.S. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (Eur. Ct. 
Justice Dec. 21, 2011). 
 2 See Memorandum, European Commission, Commissioner Malmström Welcomes the European 
Parliament’s Vote on the Common European Asylum System, MEMO/13/534 (June 12, 2013) [here-
inafter Malmström Welcomes CEAS]. 
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its responsibilities within that system.3 The CJEU’s decision in N.S. clarifies 
those responsibilities.4 
The judgment in N.S. addressed whether Member States are obliged under 
Dublin II, the EU regulation that establishes responsibility for examining asy-
lum claims, to evaluate whether the receiving state observes the fundamental 
rights of the EU.5 The CJEU ruled that under EU law, there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption, as distinguished from a conclusive presumption, that Member States 
observe fundamental rights.6 If there are substantial grounds for believing that 
an asylum seeker would face inhuman or degrading treatment in the receiving 
state, the Member State is forbidden from transferring the asylum applicant 
there.7 
Part I of this Comment describes the background of the CJEU decision in 
N.S. Part II provides a discussion of the CJEU’s holding, the conditions of the 
asylum system in Greece that underlies that holding, and the overlap between 
the judgments of the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
in the area of human rights. Part III examines the implications of the holding 
on Member States, particularly Greece. This Comment concludes by highlight-
ing the need for a revision of Dublin II to allow for wider distribution of asy-
lum claims throughout the EU. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On June 12, 2013, the European Parliament adopted a series of directives 
that authorized the establishment of a uniform asylum system across the EU.8 
The goal of the system is to assure that asylum seekers are treated fairly and 
humanely in every Member State.9 The road that led to this historic vote, how-
ever, was a tough one.10 Asylum is a fundamental right in the EU, first guaran-
teed in the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See C-411/10, N.S., ¶ 79. 
 4 See id. ¶¶ 94, 106. 
 5 See Council Regulation 343/2003, art. 3, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1, 3 (EC) [hereinafter Dublin II]; C-
411/10, N.S., ¶ 50; European Asylum Support Office, 2011 Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum 
in the European Union and on the Activities of the European Asylum Support Office, (2012), at 36 
[hereinafter EASO Report]. Dublin II replaced the earlier Dublin Convention, which had established 
the state responsible for examining asylum applications lodged in one of the Member States of the 
EU. Dublin II, art. 24. 
 6 See C-411/10, N.S. ¶¶ 104–105. 
 7 See id. ¶¶ 86, 94. 
 8 See Malmström Welcomes CEAS, supra note 2; EU Puts Common Asylum System in Place, 
European Commission (Jun. 12, 2103), http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/malmstrom/news/
archives/2013/06/20130612_en.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
 9 EU Puts Common Asylum System in Place, supra note 8. 
 10 Malmström Welcomes CEAS, supra note 2. 
74 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
associated Protocol of 1967 (Geneva Convention).11 Article 33(1) of the Gene-
va Convention prohibits Member States from expelling or returning a refugee 
to a place where he or she would risk being persecuted.12 The EU’s goal for its 
asylum policy was to establish “an area of freedom, security and justice open 
to those who, forced by circumstances, legitimately seek protection in the 
Community.”13 Implementation of such a policy is governed by the principle 
of mutual confidence and the principle of solidarity and fair sharing between 
the Member States.14 Given the persistent disparities in each Member State’s 
asylum procedures, however, it was difficult to establish a fair but effective 
distribution of asylum responsibilities across the Member States.15 The differ-
ences in systems and practice resulted in forum shopping, with asylum seekers 
lodging applications in more than one Member State and gravitating towards 
states with higher recognition rates and more social benefits.16 
In response, the European Council in 1999 negotiated a set of rules to 
harmonize asylum policies across the EU, envisioning the establishment of a 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS).17 The CEAS would ensure that 
every asylum seeker would receive the same treatment, regardless of where his 
or her application was lodged.18 In order to establish with legal certainty “a 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Opinion of Advocate General V. Trstenják in Case C-411/10 ¶ 10 [hereinafter Advocate Gen-
eral]; EASO Report, supra note 5, at 35. 
 12 See Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
150 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. (“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refu-
gee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threat-
ened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.”). 
 13 C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 14; see id. ¶ 83. 
 14 See C-411/10, N.S. ¶¶ 78–79, 93; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union arts. 78, 80, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]; see also Memo-
randum, European Commission, A Common European Asylum System, MEMO/13/532 (June 12, 
2013), at 1 [hereinafter A Common European Asylum System] (“EU Member States have a shared 
responsibility to welcome asylum seekers in a dignified manner, ensuring they are treated fairly and 
that their case is examined to uniform standards so that, no matter where an applicant applies, the 
outcome will be similar.”). 
 15 See Advocate General, supra note 11, ¶ 1; From Schengen to Stockholm, History of the CEAS, 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, http://www.ecre.org/component/content/article/36-
introduction/194-history-of-ceas.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
 16 See From Schengen to Stockholm, History of the CEAS, supra note 15. 
 17 See C-411/10, N.S. ¶¶ 6–7. To effectuate the goals of the CEAS, the European Council adopted 
legal measures establishing the substantive minimum standards for the treatment of asylum seekers 
and the examination of their applications. See Advocate General, supra note 11, ¶ 17. These include 
Directives on the minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (2003/9/EC), the qualifica-
tion as refugees (2004/83/EC), and the procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status 
(2005/85/EC); as well as Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 which created Eurodac, the EU 
database that records the fingerprints of foreign nationals illegally crossing an external border. C-
411/10, N.S. ¶ 11–13. 
 18 Briefing Notes: UNHCR Welcome EU Moves Towards a Common Asylum System, UNHCR 
(Sep. 14, 2013), available at http://www.unhcr.org/51baf2269.html. 
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clear and effective method for dealing with an asylum application,” the Mem-
ber States adopted Council Regulation No. 343/2003 (Dublin II).19 Dublin II 
established the exhaustive rules for determining the single Member State re-
sponsible for examining an asylum application lodged in the EU, and instituted 
a hierarchy of objective criteria for determining which Member State held that 
obligation.20 Significantly, Dublin II provided that the Member State where the 
asylum seeker entered the EU, whether legally or illegally, is responsible for 
examining the asylum claim.21 Dublin II was designed to streamline the asy-
lum process and avoid the inefficiencies that had previously plagued the sys-
tem.22 By designating responsibility in a single state, the regulation was de-
signed to avoid situations where no state admits responsibility for a claim and 
to prevent abuse of the system by applicants who filed their claims in multiple 
states.23 
Despite the objective rules set out in Dublin II, implementation of the 
CEAS has faced setbacks.24 Since the responsible state under Dublin II is typi-
cally the country of first arrival, the regulation places pressure on states that sit 
on the EU’s external borders and receive a disproportionately large number of 
asylum seekers.25 The text of Dublin II does not expressly contain procedures 
for the situation where a Member State’s asylum system is experiencing an 
exceptionally heavy burden.26 With its position on the southeastern border of 
the EU and its close proximity to several conflict-ridden countries, Greece has 
become the primary point of irregular border crossings into Europe.27 The asy-
lum system in Greece has become disproportionately burdened relative to oth-
er Member States because almost ninety percent of illegal immigrants enter the 
EU through its borders.28 In 2011, when the CJEU issued its ruling in N.S., the 
national asylum system in Greece had completely collapsed.29 The overloading 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See C-411/10, N.S. ¶¶ 79, 84. 
 20 See Dublin II, supra note 5, arts. 1, 17; Advocate General, supra note 11, ¶¶ 80, 93; A Com-
mon European Asylum System, supra note 14, at 4. 
 21 See Dublin II, supra note 5, arts. 9(4), 10(1). 
 22 See C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 79. 
 23 See id.; EASO Report, supra note 5, at 36. 
 24 See C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 90. 
 25 See Dublin II, supra note 5, arts. 5–14; C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 87; Special Rapporteur on the Human 
Rights of Migrants, Mission to Greece, U.N. Human Rights Council ¶ 70, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/46/
Add.4 (Apr. 18, 2013). 
 26 See Advocate General, supra note 11, ¶ 99. 
 27 See Mission to Greece, supra note 25, ¶ 5. 
 28 C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 87. 
 29 See Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Rep. Following His Visit to 
Greece from 28 January to 1 February 2013, (Apr. 16, 2013) ¶ 138 [hereinafter Commissioner Re-
port]. 
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of the asylum system in Greece is highlighted in the Joined Cases C-411/10 & 
C-493/10.30 
A. The Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10 
Case C-411/10 concerns an Afghan national, N.S., who entered Greece, 
where he was allegedly arrested and detained.31 He was eventually expelled to 
Turkey, where he contends to have been detained in appalling conditions for 
two months.32 He further claims that he escaped from detention in Turkey and 
traveled to the United Kingdom, where he submitted an asylum application on 
the day he arrived.33 Pursuant to Article 17 of Dublin II, the Secretary of State of 
the Home Department requested that Greece take charge of his application.34 
Greece did not respond to the request in a timely manner, as Article 18(7) of 
Dublin II requires.35 Accordingly, Greece was deemed by default to have ac-
cepted responsibility for N.S.’s asylum claim and the Secretary ordered him 
removed to Greece.36 
In July 2009, N.S. requested that the Secretary accept responsibility for 
his asylum claim, arguing that returning him to Greece would breach the Ge-
neva Convention and risk violating his fundamental rights under EU law and 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms (ECHR).37 The Secretary denied his request and maintained the 
order to transfer N.S. to Greece.38 He sought judicial review of the Secretary’s 
decisions and in February 2010, the High Court of Justice of England & Wales 
examined his application.39 Following the High Court’s dismissal of the appli-
cation, he appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal of England & Wales.40 
The proceeding in Case C-411/10 was joined with Case C-493/10, which 
concerns the proposed transfer of five asylum applicants from Ireland to 
Greece.41 The applicants originated from Afghanistan, Iran, and Algeria, and 
each entered the EU through Greece, where they were arrested for illegal entry 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 87. On May 16, 2011, the President of the CJEU joined Cases C-411/10 
and C-493/10 for the purposes of the written and oral procedure and the judgment. See id. ¶ 54. 
 31 See id. ¶¶ 34–35. N.S. was arrested in Greece on September 24, 2008, but he never sought 
asylum in Greece. Id. 
 32 Id. ¶ 35. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. ¶ 36. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. ¶¶ 36–37. 
 37 Id. ¶ 40. Article 3 of the ECHR recognized that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 38 C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 40. 
 39 Id. ¶ 42. 
 40 Id. ¶ 43. 
 41 Id. ¶ 51–54. 
2014] Rights of Asylum Seekers Under Dublin II 77 
and requested to leave.42 They subsequently traveled to Ireland where they ap-
plied for asylum.43 All five resisted return to Greece, arguing to the High Court 
of Ireland that the procedures and conditions for asylum seekers in Greece 
were inadequate and that Ireland should assume responsibility for their appli-
cations in accordance to Article 3(2) of Dublin II.44 
Both the Court of Appeal of England & Wales and the Irish High Court 
stayed their domestic proceedings to refer certain questions of EU law to the 
CJEU for a preliminary ruling.45 In particular, questions two through four 
asked the CJEU to determine: 
(2) Is the duty of a Member State to observe EU fundamental rights 
. . . discharged where that State sends the asylum seeker to the 
Member State which Article 3(1) [of Regulation No 343/2003] des-
ignates as the responsible State . . . , regardless of the situation in the 
responsible State? 
(3) In particular, does the obligation to observe EU fundamental 
rights preclude the operation of a conclusive presumption that the 
responsible State will observe . . . the claimant’s fundamental rights 
under European Union law . . . ? 
(4) Alternatively, is a Member State obliged by EU law, and, if so, in 
what circumstances, to exercise the power under Article 3(2) of the 
Regulation to examine and take responsibility for a claim, where 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Id. ¶ 51; Liam Thornton, Asylum Transfers from Ireland to Greece, HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRELAND, 
http://humanrights.ie/international-lawinternational-human-rights/asylum-transfers-from-ireland-to-
greece/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
 43 C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 51. 
 44 Id. ¶ 52. Article 3(2) gives each Member State the discretionary power to assume responsibility 
for an asylum claim that would otherwise be another state’s responsibility under Dublin II’s objective 
criteria. See Dublin II, supra note 5, art. 3. A Member State that voluntarily examines a claim accepts 
the obligations associated with that claim. Id. 
 45 Id. ¶¶ 49–50, 53. In accordance to Article 267 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union, when a national court is uncertain about the interpretation of EU law it may refer the question 
before it to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. See TFEU, supra note 14, art. 267. In a press release, 
the CJEU clarified that,  
A reference for a preliminary ruling allows the courts and tribunals of the Member 
States, in disputes which have been brought before them, to refer questions to the Court 
of Justice about the interpretation of European Union law or the validity of a European 
Union act. The Court of Justice does not decide the dispute itself. It is for the national 
court or tribunal to dispose of the case in accordance with the Court’s decision, which is 
similarly binding on other national courts or tribunals before which a similar issue is 
raised. 
Press Release No. 140/11, Court of Justice of the European Union, Judgment in Joined Cases C-
411/10 N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and C-493/10 M.E. and Others v Refugee 
Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (Dec. 21, 2011). 
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transfer to the responsible State would expose the [asylum] claimant 
to a risk of violation of his fundamental rights . . . ?46 
By answering these questions, the CJEU confronts a tension between 
Dublin II’s propensity to vest responsibility in the applicant’s point of entry 
and the need to distribute asylum claims throughout the EU in light of the 
overloading of the system in Member States like Greece.47 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Fundamental Right of Asylum 
The EU was founded on the universal values of human dignity, freedom, 
equality, and solidarity, and the fundamental rights that flow from those val-
ues.48 Among those fundamental rights is the right to asylum, guaranteed in 
Article 18 of the Charter and Article 78 of the TFEU.49 Underlying Dublin II 
and the other regulations and directives of the CEAS is the desire to ensure full 
observance of the right to asylum.50 For the CEAS to be effective, each Mem-
ber State must have mutual confidence that the other states comply with the 
fundamental rights of the EU in their treatment of asylum seekers.51 Accord-
ingly, Dublin II assumes that the Member State responsible for examining the 
application observe the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, the Ge-
neva Convention, and the ECHR.52 
Despite the presumption of compliance, it is possible that the asylum pro-
cedures of a given state are deficient in practice and asylum seekers transferred 
                                                                                                                           
 46 C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 50. Among the other issues the CJEU considered were: whether a decision 
adopted by a Member State under the discretionary power of Dublin II’s Article 3(2) falls within the 
scope of EU law and Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;  wheth-
er the protections set out in the Charter are wider in scope than the protections conferred by Article 3 
of the ECHR; and whether “safe country” provisions are compatible with Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Id. 
 47 See Advocate General, supra note 11, ¶ 1, 105; Mission to Greece, supra note 25, ¶ 68. 
 48 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Preamble, 2010 O.J. C 83/02, at 391 
[hereinafter Charter of Rights]; C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 1. 
 49 C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 4; Advocate General, supra note 11, ¶ 114; see TFEU, supra note 14, art. 78; 
Charter of Rights, supra note 48, art. 18, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 395. 
 50 See Dublin II, supra note 5, recital (15) in the Preamble, at 2; C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 78. 
 51 See C-411/10, N.S. ¶¶ 78, 80. 
 52 See id. ¶ 80. This assumption of compliance is reflected in the Preamble to Dublin II, which 
states that “Member States . . . are considered as safe countries for third-country nationals.” Dublin II, 
supra note 5, recital (2) in the Preamble, at 1. Before Case C-411/10 was stayed and referred to the 
CJEU, the Secretary of State asserted to the Court of Appeal of England & Wales that the Dublin II 
scheme permits a conclusive presumption that every Member State complies with its obligations un-
der EU law. See C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 47. Accordingly, the Secretary contended that she was not required 
to consider evidence that returning the appellant to Greece would risk violation of his fundamental 
rights. Id. 
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to that state would risk violation of their fundamental rights.53 For example, in 
2010, Greece experienced a disproportionate influx of asylum applicants and 
was unable to cope with the situation.54 In light of this reality, the European 
Commission proposed that Dublin II be amended to mitigate the criteria of 
lodging responsibility in the point of first entry.55 Nevertheless, the CJEU em-
phasized that allowing exceptions to the obligations of Dublin II would “de-
prive those obligations of their substance and endanger the realisation of the 
objective of quickly designating the Member State responsible.”56 In interpret-
ing Dublin II, the CJEU faced the challenge of ensuring compliance with the 
fundamental rights protected by the EU without stripping Dublin II of its clear 
objectives.57 
The CJEU resolved this tension by concluding that there is a rebuttable 
presumption, as distinguished from a conclusive presumption, that asylum ap-
plicants will be treated in a way that complies with fundamental rights in all 
Member States.58 Since the CEAS is based on a presumption of compliance, it 
would be incompatible to allow the “slightest infringement” of CEAS direc-
tives to halt the transfer of asylum seekers to the responsible state in accord-
ance to Dublin II.59 If, on the other hand, there are substantial grounds to be-
lieve that the responsible state’s asylum system is systemically flawed, transfer 
to that state would result in the infringement of fundamental rights and a viola-
tion of the Charter.60 
B. The CJEU Decision Clarifies the Obligations of the Member States to 
Examine Asylum Applications 
In light of this rebuttable presumption, the CJEU held that a Member 
State may not transfer an asylum seeker under Dublin II when it “cannot be 
unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the recep-
tion conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial 
grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being 
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment.”61 This restriction on transfer 
                                                                                                                           
 53 C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 81. 
 54 See id. ¶ 87. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. ¶ 85. 
 57 See id. ¶¶ 77, 85. CJEU case law has established that Member States should not interpret legis-
lation in a way that conflicts with the fundamental rights protected by the EU. See id. ¶ 77. 
 58 See id. ¶¶ 99–105. 
 59 See C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 84. 
 60 See id. ¶ 86. Although not addressed by the CJEU, the Advocate General in her opinion em-
phasized that operation of this rebuttable presumption “must observe the principle of effectiveness, 
according to which the realisation of the rights conferred by European Union law may not be rendered 
practically impossible or excessively difficult.” See Advocate General, supra note 11, ¶ 134. 
 61 C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 94. 
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ensures that the Member States meet their obligation to protect the fundamen-
tal rights of asylum seekers.62 
If conditions in the responsible state are such that transferring an asylum 
seeker there would risk a violation of fundamental rights, the Member State in 
which the asylum seeker is present must examine the criteria in Chapter III of 
Dublin II to determine whether any other state is responsible for the applica-
tion.63 When the responsible Member State cannot be designated based on the 
criteria in Chapter III, the Member State where the applicant first lodged his or 
her asylum claim is responsible for examining it, pursuant to Article 13 of 
Dublin II.64 That state should not take an unreasonable length of time in its 
determination and worsen the situation.65 If necessary, the Member State in 
which the asylum seeker is present must take responsibility for the asylum ap-
plication in accordance to Article 3(2) of Dublin II.66 
C. The State of the Greek Asylum System 
The applicants in the Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10 argued that 
Greece’s asylum procedures were inadequate and risked infringement of their 
fundamental rights.67 They asserted that the Member States where they lodged 
their asylum claims—the United Kingdom and Ireland—must take responsibil-
ity in accordance with Dublin II.68 Prior to the CJEU’s decision in N.S., the 
asylum system in Greece was in a state of total collapse.69 The Grand Chamber 
of the CJEU addressed several of the shortcomings of asylum procedures in 
Greece, including the procedural hurdles, the inadequate conditions for recep-
tion, the inadequate judicial remedies, and the low proportion of asylum appli-
cations granted.70 As the Advocate General emphasized in her opinion, there 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. ¶ 96. The criteria listed in Chapter III of Dublin II, designating the Member State re-
sponsible for examining the application for asylum, include family membership, possession of resi-
dence documents or visas, and length of continuous residence. See Dublin II, supra note 5, arts. 5–14. 
 64 C-411/10, N.S., ¶ 97; Dublin II, supra note 5, art. 13 (“Where no Member State responsible for 
examining the application for asylum can be designated on the basis of the criteria listed in this Regu-
lation, the first Member State with which the application for asylum was lodged shall be responsible 
for examining it.”). 
 65 C-411/10, N.S., ¶ 98. 
 66 Id.; Dublin II, supra note 5, art. 3(2) (“[E]ach Member State may examine an application for 
asylum lodged with it by a third-country national, even if such examination is not its responsibility 
under the criteria laid down in this Regulation. In such an event, that Member State shall become the 
Member State responsible within the meaning of this Regulation and shall assume the obligations 
associated with that responsibility.”). 
 67 See C-411/10, N.S., ¶¶ 40, 52. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See Commissioner Report, supra note 29, ¶ 138. 
 70 See C-411/10, N.S. ¶ 44. 
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was clear evidence of a wide gulf between the requirements for Greece’s asy-
lum system and the actual treatment of asylum seekers there.71 
Since the judgment in N.S., the Greek asylum system has been the subject 
of special review by organizations such as the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, the Council of Europe, and Amnesty International.72 All have ex-
pressed concern over Greece’s asylum policies and practices, which continue 
to suffer major shortcomings.73 Although a new Asylum Service was adopted 
in 2011 in an effort to rebuild the national asylum system, that service was not 
yet operational a year after it became law.74 Asylum seekers in detention con-
tinue to face poor sanitation, inadequate medical care, and insufficient access 
to information and legal assistance.75 Following his visit to Greece in 2013, the 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe expressly recom-
mended that EU Member States refrain from returning asylum seekers to 
Greece under Dublin II.76 
On account of its geographical location and its proximity to several con-
flict-ridden countries, Greece receives more asylum seekers than its asylum 
system can accommodate.77 Most migrants and refugees who enter the EU 
through Greece desire to travel further west to other Member States, but those 
who enter irregularly remain stuck in Greece because they are apprehended if 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See Advocate General, supra note 11, ¶ 85. 
 72 See generally Commissioner Report, supra note 29 (evaluating human rights issues in Greece, 
including major shortcomings in its asylum system, following the Commissioner of Human Right’s 
visit); Mission to Greece, supra note 25 (assessing the human rights situation of migrants in Greece 
following the Special Rapporteur’s official visit); AMNESTY INT’L, Greece: The End of the Road for 
Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Migrants, AI Index EUR 25/011/2012 (Dec. 20, 2012) [hereinafter The 
End of the Road] (describing the state of the asylum system in Greece). 
 73 See Commissioner Report, supra note 29, at 3; Mission to Greece, supra note 25, ¶¶ 68, 85; 
The End of the Road, supra note 72, at 2. 
 74 See Mission to Greece, supra note 25, ¶ 21. The proposed Asylum Service is part of Greece’s 
National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration Management, which it submitted to the European 
Commission in August 2010. See id. (citing insufficient budget and staff as the reasons why the Asy-
lum Service is not yet operational). 
 75 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Dep’t of State, 2012 Coun-
try Reports on Human Rights Practices–Greece (2013), at 11–13. For example, evaluators found that 
“authorities detained migrants, including members of vulnerable groups such as unaccompanied mi-
nors, in overcrowded cells and did not separate adult males from unaccompanied minors. Medical 
care, beds, and toilet and washing facilities were almost nonexistent; food was insufficient and of poor 
quality; access to interpreters, lawyers, and telephones was scarce and not guaranteed.” Id. at 13. 
 76 See Commissioner Report, supra note 29, ¶ 150. Similarly, Amnesty International recommend-
ed that Member States maintain their halt on Dublin II transfers to Greece, in light of the rulings of the 
ECtHR and the CJEU. The End of the Road, supra note 72, at 12. 
 77 See Commissioner Report ¶¶ 139–140; Mission to Greece, supra note 25, ¶ 5. The police direc-
torate, which receives ninety percent of Greece’s asylum applications, only accepts approximately 
fifty applications per week. See Commissioner Report, supra note 29, ¶ 140. Asylum seekers who are 
waiting to lodge their applications wait outdoors in line night after night, and are reportedly exposed 
to police abuse. See id. ¶ 140. 
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they attempt to leave.78 The vast majority of illegal entries into the EU occur 
through Greece’s borders, and the nation’s policy is to systematically detain all 
irregular border-crossers and asylum seekers for up to eighteen months.79 
Since 2012, there has been a concerted effort to crack down on irregular 
border-crossers.80 Surveillance programs include “Xenios Zeus,” a police op-
eration focused on verifying the legal status of migrants, and “Poseidon Sea,” a 
Frontex operation that intercepts migrants trying to reach Italy by boat from 
the west coast of Greece.81 In an effort to deter illegal entries by land, Greece 
completed construction of a 10.5 kilometer fence along the Turkey-Greece 
border in December 2012.82 The fence raised concerns that people seeking in-
ternational protection would undertake unsafe crossings and face additional 
dangers.83 In addition, there have been numerous reports of unlawful forced 
expulsions of irregular migrants.84 Given that many irregular border-crossers 
enter Greece from conflict-ridden countries, these forced expulsions are par-
ticularly dangerous and risk refoulment.85 Paralleling this recent rise in border 
security has been a significant increase in xenophobic violence against irregu-
lar migrants.86 Victims are often unwilling to report these attacks at the risk of 
being detained and deported.87 Furthermore, the police have been accused of 
tolerating and even perpetrating this xenophobic violence.88 
The CJEU, by expressly addressing the flawed Greek asylum system in 
its judgment, acknowledged the possibility of a responsible state operating be-
low the minimum standards presumed in Dublin II.89 By rejecting a conclusive 
presumption that Member States comply with fundamental rights, the CJEU 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See Mission to Greece, supra note 25, ¶¶ 9–10; AMNESTY INT’L, Enter at Your Peril: Lives Put 
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mirrored a decision by the European Court of Human Rights from earlier that 
year.90 
D. The Interplay Between the Court of Justice of the European Union and 
the European Court of Human Rights 
The CJEU has jurisdiction over all matters of EU law.91 After the Treaty 
of Lisbon came into force in 2009, the CJEU acquired jurisdiction over the 
fundamental rights contained in the ECHR.92 In matters of EU law concerning 
fundamental rights, Member States are also subject to the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).93 Given the overlap in jurisdic-
tion, enhanced cooperation is required between the two courts in cases related 
to compliance with the ECHR.94 
Shortly after the order for reference for a preliminary ruling was made to 
the CJEU in N.S., the ECtHR delivered its first judgment on Dublin II transfers 
and held that Member States may not presume that asylum seekers are treated 
in a manner complying with the ECHR.95 Based on a similar set of facts to 
Case C-411/10, M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece concerned the transfer of an Af-
ghan asylum seeker from Belgium to Greece pursuant to the procedure set out 
in Dublin II.96 Not only did the ECtHR find that Greece’s asylum conditions 
violated the ECHR, but that Belgium had also violated the ECHR by transfer-
ring the applicant back to Greece and knowingly exposing him to the systemic 
deficiencies of that country’s asylum procedure.97 
The ECtHR delivered the M.S.S. ruling in January 2011 and it was refer-
enced in N.S.98 The CJEU drew attention to the instruments that the ECtHR 
had considered to determine whether there were systemic deficiencies in 
Greece’s asylum procedure, particularly reports, correspondence, and pro-
posals submitted by international organizations.99 Given their participation in 
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the Council of the European Union, Member States may not claim to lack 
knowledge of the information contained in these instruments.100 Accordingly, 
the CJEU concluded that Member States have sufficient instruments to assess 
the responsible state’s compliance with fundamental rights.101 
Although the two decisions came to similar conclusions—that a Member 
State must apply Dublin II in a manner that complies with the fundamental 
rights—M.S.S. addressed only the rights conferred by the ECHR, while N.S. 
addressed both the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union.102 The rulings of the ECtHR and the CJEU catalyzed a revision of 
Dublin II, which the EU codified in Council Regulation No. 604/2013.103 Bor-
rowing the language of the CJEU in N.S., Article 3(2) of the recast regulation 
includes an express provision requiring Member States to continue examining 
an asylum application when transfer would risk inhuman or degrading treat-
ment.104 The revision also enhances the legal protections of asylum seekers by 
guaranteeing the right to appeal a transfer decision, free legal counsel, a per-
sonal interview, and access to detailed and translated information regarding the 
regulation.105 
III. ANALYSIS 
The judgment of the CJEU in N.S. clarified the obligations of Member 
States under Dublin II, but did not ultimately effectuate Dublin II’s goal of the 
fair sharing of asylum claims across the EU.106 After the CJEU’s judgment, 
there was no longer any doubt that every Member State has an affirmative ob-
ligation to examine the responsible state’s asylum policies for systemic defi-
ciencies before deporting an asylum seeker there.107 Although there is a pre-
sumption that every Member State complies with fundamental rights, that pre-
sumption is rebuttable and not conclusive.108 This rebuttable presumption 
acknowledges that the asylum system in some Member States may be so 
flawed as to be in violation of basic human rights.109 
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By requiring Member States to be aware of those deficiencies, the judg-
ment in N.S. compelled states to consider more seriously the principles of soli-
darity and fair sharing that underlie Dublin II, in accordance with Article 80 of 
the TFEU.110 Member States are not permitted to blindly rely on Dublin II’s 
objective criteria and risk violating the fundamental rights of asylum seekers in 
the process of transferring them to the designated responsible state.111 The 
CJEU reaffirmed the ECtHR’s ruling in M.S.S. by concluding that the funda-
mental rights of asylum seekers are guaranteed by the ECHR, and also extend-
ed this guarantee to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Un-
ion.112 
In both N.S. and the ECtHR’s decision in M.S.S., Greece was the primary 
example of a Member State with systemic deficiencies in its asylum proce-
dures.113 By highlighting that Dublin II transfers to Greece would infringe fun-
damental rights, the rulings of the CJEU and the ECtHR mandated other na-
tions in the EU to share the migration inflows that had overburdened 
Greece.114 Thus, these recent decisions seemed to open doors to a wider distri-
bution of asylum claims across the EU.115 Following these two decisions, 
transfers of asylum seekers to Greece under Dublin II have effectively halt-
ed.116 
Despite efforts to improve the situation of its asylum system, the deplora-
ble asylum policies and practices in Greece have persisted, if not worsened.117 
Recent border enforcement designed to reduce the number of illegal entries 
into Greece have only led to heightened risks and dangers for irregular border-
crossers.118 Discrimination and violence against migrants is widespread, and 
has only escalated in recent years.119 
Although the CJEU’s decision in N.S. was codified in June 2013, the re-
cast Dublin II continues to overburden the Greek asylum system.120 Changes 
on paper will not lead to changes on the ground while vast differences in the 
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distribution of asylum claims across the EU remain.121 Greece continues to 
receive a disproportionate number of asylum applications, and other Member 
States seem content to allow Greece to serve as their gatekeeper.122 
As the systemic deficiencies of Greece’s asylum system continue, it is in-
creasingly apparent that Dublin II is not sustainable in the long run and needs 
to be further revised.123 By requiring the point of first entry to be solely re-
sponsible for asylum applications, Dublin II will only continue to overburden 
Greece’s dysfunctional asylum system.124 In light of this reality, the Dublin II 
regulation should be amended to create channels for distributing asylum claims 
from Member States with systemic deficiencies in their asylum procedures to 
less-burdened states.125 A wider and more balanced distribution of asylum 
claims across the EU would reflect the principle of solidarity and fair sharing 
of responsibility, which is at the heart of Dublin II.126 
After years of negotiation, the European Parliament voted in June 2013 to 
adopt the CEAS, a package of EU asylum directives and regulations of which 
Dublin II is part.127 While Dublin II operating on its own has not been effective 
in creating a balanced distribution of asylum flows, the EU is hopeful that the 
CEAS scheme will be.128 The historic passage of the CEAS reemphasizes that 
shared responsibility and mutual confidence are important shared goals across 
the EU.129 As the European Commission works to implement the CEAS and 
guarantee fair and humane treatment of asylum seekers regardless of where 
they enter the EU, it will undoubtedly face setbacks in Greece.130 If Dublin II 
continues to operate in its current state, the goals of the CEAS will be impossi-
ble to meet.131 
CONCLUSION 
The CJEU’s judgment in N.S. coupled with the ECtHR’s ruling in M.S.S. 
is a welcome clarification of obligations under Dublin II. In the wake of these 
two decisions, Member States halted the practice of transferring asylum seek-
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ers to Greece, a state with an asylum system that unquestionably violated fun-
damental rights. Despite these efforts to lighten Greece’s load, it continues to 
receive more claims than its faulty asylum system can handle. As the EU makes 
efforts to implement the CEAS, it will undoubtedly face a tension between the 
goal of joint responsibility between the Member States and the disproportion-
ate burden that Greece faces under Dublin II. If the EU wishes to act in full 
accordance to the principles of solidarity and fair sharing, the Dublin II regula-
tion must be further revised to incorporate mechanisms that shift asylum 
claims out of Greece to less burdened States. 
